Sharing Underwriters with Rivals: Implications for Competition in Investment Banking by Asker, Jhon & Ljungqvist, Alexander
 
 
Sharing Underwriters with Rivals: Implications for 
Competition in Investment Banking * † 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 John Asker Alexander Ljungqvist 
 Stern School of Business Stern School of Business 
 New York University New York University 
  and CEPR   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 6, 2005 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
* We are grateful to Robert Daines, Darrell Duffie, William Greene, Joy Ishii, Victoria Ivashina, Terrence Odean, 
Glenn Okun, Paul Pfleiderer, Johan Waldén, Nancy Wallace, Lawrence White, and Jeffrey Zwiebel for useful 
suggestions, and to seminar audiences at Stanford University, the University of California at Berkeley, the 
University of Southern California, the University of Amsterdam, and RSM Erasmus University for helpful 
comments. All errors are our own. 
† Address for correspondence: Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 West Fourth Street, New York 
NY 10012-1126. Asker: Phone 212-998-0062; fax 212-995-4218; e-mail jasker@stern.nyu.edu. Ljungqvist: Phone 
212-998-0304; fax 212-995-4220; e-mail aljungqv@stern.nyu.edu.  
  
2
 
 
Sharing Underwriters with Rivals: Implications for 
Competition in Investment Banking  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We conjecture that issuing firms seek to avoid sharing underwriters with their product-market 
rivals in order to limit the risk that strategically sensitive information is leaked to a rival firm via 
the underwriter relationship. We investigate this conjecture in a sample of 5,272 equity deals and 
12,453 debt deals by large U.S. firms between 1975 and 2003. Using several distinct sources of 
identification, we find that this phenomenon is at least as important in determining the choice of 
lead underwriter as the bank’s reputation or the issuing firm’s existing relationship with the 
underwriter. We argue that this finding has important implications for understanding the nature 
of competition among investment banks, the durability of underwriting relationships, the success 
of entrants, and the likely impact of investment bank mergers on market power. 
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Informational frictions are at the heart of securities underwriting and influence how banks compete for 
deal flow. For instance, reputation enables an investment bank to certify the validity of information 
released when a company sells securities to less well-informed investors (Booth and Smith (1986), 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)). It has long been acknowledged that reputation can, as a result, 
present a barrier to entry . Other apparently important competitive tools are the provision of research 
analyst coverage (Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2005)) and, to a lesser extent, market-making 
(Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2005)). Price competition, on the other hand, does not appear to play a 
large role in securities underwriting (Chen and Ritter (2000)).  
In this paper, we investigate how informational frictions create a different constraint on 
competition in investment banking: The need to maintain exclusive client relationships to avoid 
information leakage. We contend that corporate issuers care about the risk that sensitive information 
revealed to their underwriters may be disclosed to one of their product-market competitors when 
underwriting services are provided by a common bank. This leads us to the following conjecture: All 
else equal, issuing firms will seek to avoid sharing underwriters with a rival firm to limit the risk that 
the rival may take advantage of sensitive information the bank became privy to.  
Several models exist in the corporate finance and industrial organization literatures that formalize 
the concern expressed in the information disclosure conjecture (albeit not with our application in 
mind).1 Intuitively, the story is as follows. Through due diligence and other activities designed to 
protect their reputations with investors, banks gain access to a great deal of commercially sensitive 
information about their clients. This information may include details of distribution channels, customer 
lists, new product launches, future cash flow projections, and the progress of research and development 
projects. Information about any of these areas of operations may give a competing firm a strategic 
advantage, and it is likely that verifiability problems will prevent banks from committing contractually 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Anand and Galetovic (2000, 2002), Baccara (2005), Baccara and Razin (2004), and Zabojnik (2002). An 
interesting empirical study of related issues in the pharmaceutical industry is Azoulay (2004). 
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to keeping information secret. Thus, if the underwriter is shared with a rival firm, issuing companies 
are likely to be concerned that contact between the rival and the bank increases the risk that sensitive 
information is leaked. If so, the structure of existing bank-firm relationships in its industry limits a 
firm’s choice of investment bank. Our empirical results provide strong support for this conjecture. 
Previous work by Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2005, 2006) has made it clear that prior 
bank-firm relationships (along with bank reputation and the provision of research analyst coverage) are 
first-order determinants of which bank an issuing firm will choose to underwrite its next debt or equity 
offer. That is, demand for underwriting services is sticky relative to other industries.2 An important 
contribution of our paper is to explain why issuers typically maintain strong relationships with one 
investment bank. With a limited number of banks capable of executing large or complex deals, there 
may simply be too few banks to allow each company to have multiple relationship banks while at the 
same time avoiding sharing banks with a major rival. Entry by commercial banks appears to have 
played an important role in loosening this constraint since deregulation began in 1988, and as a result 
we document a stunning shift away from exclusive bank-firm relationships during the 1990s, 
especially in the debt markets where commercial banks have made the greatest inroads.3 The fact that 
we observe no corresponding shift away from banks serving at most one large client per industry 
indicates that clients are indeed careful whom they choose to have relationships with.  
A second, and potentially more insidious, reason for persistent underwriting relationships is that 
information disclosure concerns impose a cost on firms when terminating a bank relationship. Upon 
termination, the risk that the bank discloses information about its former client surely increases, and 
our empirical results show that banks that have recently lost clients become much more attractive to 
other large firms in the same industry. As a result, relationship banks enjoy a measure of hold-up 
                                                          
2 This stylized fact likely applies to service industries generally, as compared to manufacturing or retail industries. 
Similarly, the results in this paper are likely to have more general applicability. 
3 See Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999), Gande et al. (1997), and Yasuda (2005) for further evidence concerning the effects 
of commercial bank entry into debt underwriting. 
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power over their clients which would strengthen bank-firm relationships and may help explain the 
apparent absence of price competition.4,5  
To examine the extent to which the information disclosure conjecture is empirically relevant, we 
take as a maintained assumption that underwriters gain access to sensitive information and examine the 
propensity for a bank’s relationships with rivals to affect an issuer’s choice of underwriter. Attributing 
the estimated impact of a rival relationship on underwriter choice to concerns about information 
disclosure presents a series of interesting identification challenges. The first problem is how to separate 
the attraction of a bank’s accumulated industry expertise from information leakage concerns: A bank 
serving a rival will likely have more experience of the issuing firm’s industry, and thus greater 
credibility with investors, than a bank that has no rival clients in the industry. Second, information 
leakage could work in both directions: While a firm may not wish for its own information to be 
disclosed, using a shared underwriter may enable it to glean useful information about a rival. Ideally, 
we would like to measure the relative impacts of the costs and benefits of such information leakage. 
We approach these challenges with a series of identification strategies. Each provides evidence that 
is strongly consistent with our conjecture. Using a set of 5,272 equity and 12,453 debt deals completed 
by large (and therefore strategically relevant) firms between 1975 and 2003, we demonstrate that 
relationships with a large rival company have a negative effect on the choice of underwriter in a probit 
specification. The estimated marginal effects suggest that the desire to avoid sharing an underwriter is 
first-order economically, both in the equity and the debt markets.  
The probit coefficients likely understate the effect of information disclosure concerns to the extent 
that they are contaminated by the positive impact of industry expertise. To separate out information 
disclosure concerns from industry expertise, we examine the behavior of rival firms when their 
relationship banks merge. Using exogenous variation from bank mergers enables us to hold industry 
                                                          
4 For an analysis of hold-up in lending relationships, see Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992) and Petersen and Rajan (1995). 
5 See Hansen (2001) on the recent Department of Justice investigation into fee competition on Wall Street. 
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expertise constant while increasing the probability of information leakage occurring. While there have 
been numerous mergers over the sample period, we find that banks have largely avoided merging with 
another bank that has large, rival clients. Where there has been overlap, we show that issuers intending 
to raise equity capital are more likely to switch away from their relationship bank than if the merger 
involves no overlap or if the bank has not been involved in a merger. Economically, the effect is 
extremely large, increasing a client’s switching probability by more than thirty percentage points. 
Finally, we tease apart the informational costs and benefits of information leakage concerns by 
looking at firms’ responses to their rivals switching relationship banks. The key to identification here is 
the fact that when a rival client ends its relationship with a bank, the bank continues to benefit from 
superior knowledge of the rival’s operations but no longer represents a danger that information might 
be leaked to the rival. Such a bank should thus be more attractive to an issuing company operating in 
the same industry, and our results strongly support this prediction. Moreover, under relatively weak 
assumptions, we can estimate the net effect of information disclosure concerns, which we find to be 
many times larger economically than any other effect, including bank reputation and the estimated 
benefit of prior relationships between the bank and the issuing company. 
Our findings have important implications for how competition among investment banks is viewed. 
Previously, prior bank-firm relationships were seen as the key facet of demand influencing competition 
in underwriting (Anand and Galetovic (2001), Yafeh and Yosha (2001), Yasuda (2005)). This shaped a 
view in which entry was difficult, as the position of incumbents was protected by their long history of 
involvement with many issuers. The competitive advantage from relationships embedded in a bank’s 
employees could hence be argued to be overwhelming. Our evidence suggests that this view of 
competition in investment banking is overly simplistic.  
Instead, competition among underwriters is more subtle. The sensitivity of firms to the risk of 
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information leakage makes it unlikely that any one underwriter will ever dominate the provision of 
underwriting services for a given client industry. Rather, industry expertise will likely remain spread 
across several banks. Likewise, the possibility of mergers to create a dominant position for a bank is 
weakened in underwriting since client firms will be highly likely to switch to another bank if a merger 
leads to underwriting services being shared across rivals. Moreover, entry by sufficiently credible 
players, such as that by commercial banks during the 1990s, is not only possible but likely to be 
successful despite traditionally strong bank-firm relationships.  
While the picture up to this point seems pro-competitive, it is balanced by the fact that, within the 
set of banks with expertise in a given industry, an issuing firm’s choice of underwriter is significantly 
constrained by information leakage concerns. This means that information leakage limits the choice set 
of issuing firms, restricting their ability to substitute away from an existing relationship bank, should 
they choose to. This effect is likely to dampen competition in the investment banking industry and may 
help explain why there is little evidence of price competition in underwriting. 
We have no “smoking gun” that proves issuers’ apparent reluctance to share underwriters is due to 
information disclosure concerns. Other explanations are certainly possible, though we can think of 
none that are first-order and that fit all the facts we document. Regardless of the true explanation, the 
implications for the industrial organization of the investment banking industry derived above follow 
from the fact that issuers avoid sharing underwriters with their rivals, and not from our conjectured 
explanation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a series of 
stylized facts about the underwriting industry and so set the stage for confronting our conjecture with 
empirical evidence. Section II sketches the empirical strategy and describes the data. Section III 
develops each empirical strategy in detail and discusses the results. Section IV concludes. 
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I. Stylized Industry Facts 
In this section we graph certain characteristics of the underwriting market in the U.S. over the 
period 1970 to 2003 to generate stylized facts about the industry. The data come from the U.S. New 
Issues database of Thomson Financial’s Securities Data Corporation, excluding only financial and 
governmental issuers (i.e., SIC codes in the 6000s and 9000s) and non-underwritten issues. Applying 
these filters yields 54,659 transactions ranging from IPOs to seasoned debt and equity offerings, 
including both public and private offerings and firms. In constant 1996 dollars, the aggregate amount 
raised in these transactions exceeds $5 trillion. The distribution of different transaction types is 
reported in Table I. Public common stock and public nonconvertible debt offerings account for 35.5% 
and 26.9% of transactions, respectively, but public debt dominates in dollar terms. 
Owing to differences in the amount and nature of information disclosed, equity and debt 
underwriting are best thought of as separate markets. The nature of debt securities implies that 
investors are mostly concerned with downside (repayment) risk, while equity investors are (relatively) 
more concerned about the upside. As a consequence, a bank’s due diligence – and hence the 
information it learns about its corporate clients – may focus more on left-tail risk in debt issues and 
more on right-tail risk in equity issues. While it is hard to generalize, we expect industry rivals, in most 
situations, to be more interested in the latter, to the extent that corporate strategy, acquisition plans, 
investment policy etc. have a greater expected impact on equity than on debt returns.  
A. Market Share Concentration  
We compute a bank’s annual market share as the combined proceeds of all issues it lead managed 
(with equal credit given in the case of co-leads), divided by the total proceeds raised by issuers that 
year.6 Figures 1a and 1b show annual concentration measures for the equity and debt underwriting 
markets over the period 1970 through 2003. Both appear somewhat concentrated. Historically, the four 
                                                          
6 Throughout the paper, we focus attention on a firm’s lead manager (rather than lower-tier members of its underwriting 
syndicates) as this is where the bank-firm relationship and thus any confidential information reside. 
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largest equity underwriters have had a combined market share of between 31% in 1971 and 71% in 
1977, with a long-run average of 51%, while the C4 measure for debt underwriting has fluctuated 
between 45% in 1997 and 63% in 1984, with a mean of 53%. Thus, the main difference is that 
concentration is much more variable over time in equity underwriting than in debt underwriting. (The 
same basic pattern is true at the ten-bank level.) Its C4 places underwriting well within the set of 
industries that invite occasional (but not constant) regulatory supervision by the Federal Trade 
Commission and Department of Justice for potential competition law violations.7  
Figures 1a and 1b also plot the C20, C30, C40, and C50 concentration measures. The fifty largest 
debt underwriters account for at least 98% of debt underwriting activity. The equity market 
accommodates slightly more players. C50 fluctuates between 86% and 100%, with an average of 96%. 
The remaining 4% is split among 82 banks in an average year.  
B. Entry 
The most notable force shaping the structure of the investment banking industry over the last two 
decades has been deregulation of Glass-Steagall separation of commercial and investment banking. In 
a series of steps beginning in 1988, commercial banks were allowed to underwrite securities offerings 
for the first time since 1933, culminating in the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. Commercial 
banks responded by either building capital markets operations in-house or acquiring investment banks 
(or, in some cases, both).  
Figures 2a and 2b show the annual number of commercial banks active in equity and debt 
underwriting in the U.S., respectively, as well as their combined annual market share. While the 
number of commercial banks offering underwriting services is now fairly large, most do little business. 
A handful of commercial banks, including Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, and Bank of America, have 
                                                          
7 As a point of comparison, consider the following industries. In 1997 the beer industry had a C4 of 89.7%; motor vehicle 
manufacturing had a C4 of 82.4%; bookstores had a C4 of 54.1%; semiconductor manufacturing had a C4 of 52.5%; and 
pharmaceutical manufacturing had a C4 of 32.3%. (All numbers are by value of shipments. They are taken from Census 
(2001), Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing, 1997 Economic Census, Manufacturing, Subject Series, Table 2; and 
Census (2000), Concentration of Firms: Retail Trade, Economic Census, Retail Trade, Subject Series, Table 6.) 
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taken substantial business away from the investment banks, and as a group, commercial banks now 
have around 70% of the debt underwriting market and 38% of the equity underwriting market.  
C. Exclusivity of Client Relationships  
We code a bank as having an equity (debt) client in industry i in quarter t if it has lead managed 
one or more equity (debt) issues for a firm in that industry over the five years ending in quarter t-1. 
Since SDC does not provide underwriting data for the 1960s, observations before 1975 are based on 
less than five years of data.  
Figure 3a plots the fraction of equity underwriters that have exactly one client among the top 3, 5, 
or 10 largest firms (ranked by annual Compustat net sales) in an industry (defined as a four-digit SIC 
code), conditional on having at least one such client. Prior to the mid 1990s, exclusivity in client 
relationships was evidently the norm in the equity market: Nearly every bank had at most one client 
among the three largest firms in an industry. Even among the ten largest firms in an industry, banks 
evidently maintained client exclusivity, given the around 95% frequency of having only one such 
client.8 From the mid 1990s on, we see a modest decline in client exclusivity, especially in the fraction 
of underwriter-industry pairs that involve an exclusive relationship with a top 10 firm. 
Debt underwriting relationships, shown in Figure 3b, display the same pattern of exclusivity 
though the level of exclusivity is consistently lower than in the equity market and the recent decline 
has been steeper, with the fraction of banks doing business with a single top 10 firm in an industry 
falling from 96% to 76% over the sample period.  
                                                          
8 To provide a benchmark for this frequency, we compute the probability that a bank has exactly one large client per 
industry conditional on having any large clients in the industry, under the assumption that firms choose randomly with 
replacement from among B banks. The fewer firms are active issuers in an industry, the more likely it is that banks have no 
more than one large client per industry. On average, industries have between two and three active issuers ranked among the 
ten largest firms. The conditional probability of having one client given ten banks varies from 59.4% in industries with ten 
active issuers to 80.1% with five active issuers, 89.7% with three active issuers, and 94.7% with two. These benchmarks are 
illustrative only; unlike our subsequent econometric models, they do not condition on bank characteristics affecting how 
many banks can actually serve an issuer’s particular requirements. 
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D. Exclusivity of Bank Relationships  
Figures 4a and 4b show the extent to which issuing firms have tended to concentrate their 
underwriting business with a single bank. We measure this by calculating the total amount raised by 
each issuing firm in a given window and then looking at how this was shared among the one or more 
banks acting as lead manager. (For the purposes of the figures, we use one-, two-, and three-year 
windows.) From this we construct a Herfindahl index of the concentration of each issuer’s bank 
relationships. A Herfindahl of one indicates an exclusive bank relationship. We then take a weighted 
average over firms in a quarter, weighting by the total proceeds raised in each firm’s debt or equity 
issues over the relevant window. Weighting has the effect of reducing average exclusivity, indicating 
that larger issuers are more likely to have more than one relationship bank.  
The patterns in Figures 4a and 4b are striking. Prior to the mid 1990s, bank relationships were 
nearly all exclusive. Debt relationships were historically less concentrated than equity relationships. 
From the mid 1990s on, bank relationships have become stunningly less exclusive in both markets. For 
the average equity issuer, concentration has fallen from around 0.95 to between 0.62 and 0.7 in 
2003Q4, depending on the window used, suggesting that by the end of the sample period, the dominant 
model is no longer an exclusive bank relationship but a set of multiple relationships around a core bank 
that is awarded a disproportionate share of the average issuer’s underwriting business. This may be the 
result of efforts to engender competition among banks in terms of either fees or some dimension of 
service. Alternatively, it is possible that commercial banks (which began entering the market around 
this time) leaned on their borrowers to share their underwriting business in return for preferential loan 
terms (Drucker and Puri (2005)). In the debt market, the decline in exclusivity has been even steeper. 
By the end of the sample period, average relationship concentration had fallen to between 0.39 and 
0.47, depending on the window, a level consistent with a stable two- or three-bank relationship. 
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Figures 1 through 4 present a picture of an industry in flux. Banks have traditionally found it hard 
to work for competing firms in an industry, which suggests the presence of concerns among issuing 
firms about conflicts of interest. While it has become more common to see banks providing 
underwriting services for more than one of the largest firms in a given industry, this is still a relatively 
rare event. On the issuer side, the data suggest two regimes. Prior to the mid 1990s, firms typically 
maintained relationships with just one bank. More recently, firms have started fostering relationships 
with multiple banks, perhaps in response to entry by commercial banks. This pattern is very sharp in 
the firm-level data shown in Figures 4a and 4b, with no corresponding break in the bank-level data 
shown in Figures 3a and 3b. This suggests that firms are being selective in how they choose their 
underwriters and pay attention to who their underwriters’ other clients are. 
In the remainder of the paper, we seek to unravel the interplay of the relationships between issuing 
firms and underwriters on the one hand and an issuing firm’s choice of underwriter on the other. 
Specifically, we investigate how concerns that sharing underwriters may lead to information being 
leaked to competitors impact the demand for underwriting services. 
II. Data and Methodology 
A. Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical strategy is to look for sources of exogenous variation that allow us to mimic the 
following experiment. Take an issuing firm, operating in an oligopoly setting, and two banks. One 
bank has a relationship with one of the firm’s major product-market rivals, while the other bank has no 
client in the industry. In all other respects the banks are equal. If the issuing firm prefers the bank with 
no rival relationship, we will view this as consistent with the firm having concerns about information 
leaking to its rival via the underwriting relationship. As in all empirical work, the challenge is to find 
sources of exogenous variation that allow us to draw meaningful conclusions about the impact of 
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information disclosure on the demand for underwriting services. 
There are, potentially, many tradeoffs in a firm’s decision about whether to share an underwriter 
with a competitor. Perhaps most importantly, the firm may trade off the underwriter’s industry 
expertise garnered from dealing with rivals against the chance that the underwriter may leak sensitive 
information to a competitor. Controlling for this effect will be an ongoing challenge in our treatment of 
the data. We confront this issue in a number of different ways. The firm may also consider sharing an 
underwriter in the hope that it will learn some information about its competitors in the process. This 
will often prove to be observationally equivalent to benefiting from an underwriter’s accumulated 
industry expertise (at least in our data).9  
Before discussing the sources of exogenous variation that we exploit to identify the impact of 
information disclosure concerns, we describe our sample and data. 
B. Sample and Data  
The estimation sample is a subset of the transactions used to construct Figures 1 through 4. In 
addition to excluding financial and governmental issuers10 and non-underwritten deals, we impose 
three more filters. First, certain variables are constructed using five years of pre-deal data, which limits 
us to transactions completed from 1975 onwards. Second, we require that each deal was lead-managed 
by one of the 50 largest underwriters ranked by market share in the year of the offering. Third, we 
restrict attention to the ten largest firms (by Compustat net sales) in each four-digit SIC industry. We 
do so because leaked information has the most strategic value to large firms as these can affect the 
market equilibrium. We thus implicitly assume that firms below the top 10 are typically price-takers 
and so are unlikely to be strategically affected by information spilling over from or to the largest firms 
                                                          
9 A related issue is that firms may wish to share underwriters to share information and facilitate collusion in the product 
market. While this may be conceivable, we find it difficult to envisage an investment bank having a sufficiently strong 
incentive to be party to such an arrangement and thus leave this issue undeveloped. 
10 Our results are qualitatively unchanged if we also exclude regulated industries (SIC 4000-4999). 
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in their markets.11 To the extent that this assumption is incorrect, we bias our tests against finding 
support for the information disclosure conjecture.  
Applying these filters yields 17,725 transactions by 3,406 distinct companies in 418 different four-
digit SIC industries raising $2.4 trillion in constant 1996 dollars. These transactions account for 35.4% 
of the deals completed and 51.5% of the amount raised by U.S. non-financial companies in 
underwritten offerings over the period 1975-2003. As Table I shows, public nonconvertible debt and 
common stock offerings account for the majority of deals and proceeds.12  
In some specifications, we split the sample period in 1990. Table I shows that the pace of capital 
market issuance by the ten largest firms in an industry has increased since 1990. There were 55% more 
transactions raising 119% more capital in 1990-2003 compared to 1975-1989.  
C. Sample of Competing Banks 
Estimating a bank’s probability of being selected to lead manage a particular offering requires data 
for both the successful bank and its competitors. In the case of an equity (debt) transaction in year t, we 
treat as lead manager candidates the 50 banks with the largest equity (debt) underwriting market share 
during that year.13 This follows the approach taken in Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2005). As we 
saw in Figure 1, the combined market shares of the top 50 banks is very high, averaging 96.5% in the 
equity market and 99.5% in the debt market over the 1970-2003 period. 
D. Bank-firm and Bank-rival Relationships 
Our measure of the strength of bank-firm relationships follows the procedure in Ljungqvist, 
Marston, and Wilhelm (2006). Let djktP  denote the aggregate proceeds company k raised in deals lead-
managed by bank j over the four quarters preceding quarter t in deals of type d = {equity, debt}.14,15 The 
                                                          
11 The product market share of the tenth largest Compustat firm in the average industry between 1970 and 2003 is 1.5%, 
with a range from nearly zero to 6.1%. This puts an upper bound on the market shares of excluded firms. 
12 Results are unchanged if we restrict estimation to public nonconvertible debt and common stock offerings. 
13 By construction, a commercial bank is treated as competing for a lead-management mandate prior to the repeal of the 
Glass-Steagall Act only if it had a so called Section 20 subsidiary with the relevant securities underwriting authority. 
14 Results remain significant using longer windows, though they become progressively weaker. 
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strength of company k’s type-d relationship with bank j then is ∑= j djktdjktdjkt PPR . djktR  ranges from 
zero (no relationship) to 100% (when the company maintained an exclusive bank relationship).  
Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2005) present evidence that some banks, and especially new 
entrants, accept lower syndicate positions (specifically, “co-manager”) as a way to establish 
relationships with an issuing company with a view to becoming its preferred lead manager in future. 
To capture this, we compute codjktR
−  using the prior four quarters of co-management data. 
Table II reports summary statistics for djktR  and 
cod
jktR
− , broken down by whether or not the 
candidate bank was chosen as lead manager for the deal in question. Ahead of equity transactions, the 
average successful candidate bank had lead-managed 13% and 6.5% of the issuing company’s equity 
and debt transactions by value over the prior four quarters, respectively. By comparison, unsuccessful 
candidate banks had significantly weaker relationships with the issuing company. The same pattern 
holds for co-management relationships as well as ahead of debt transactions. 
Our primary focus is on the effect of a bank’s relationships with an issuer’s principal product-
market competitors. To this end, we set a dummy variable equal to one if, during the five years before 
company k’s equity (debt) transaction in quarter t, candidate bank j lead-managed one or more equity 
(debt) transactions for one or more firms (other than k itself) ranked among the three largest companies 
(based on annual Compustat net sales) in k’s four-digit SIC industry. We similarly code a dummy 
variable capturing relationships with firms ranked fourth through tenth in k’s industry. Using a five-
year window is conservative, since there is no guarantee that every rival is still one of the bank’s 
clients toward the end of the window. To the extent that the rival has since switched banks, concerns 
about information being disclosed are eliminated, biasing us against finding support for the 
information disclosure conjecture. In Section III.D, we will exploit variation in the duration of rival 
relationships to construct a more powerful test of the conjecture.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
15 Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006) also control for lending relationships. However, systematic data on bank loans 
are not available for the 1970s and 1980s.  
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As shown in Table II, a greater fraction of winning banks than of losing banks had relationships 
with an issuer’s top 3 or top 4-10 rivals, ahead of either equity or debt transactions. This univariate 
result runs counter to our conjecture that concerns over information leaking to rivals influence 
underwriter choice. But as mentioned in the introduction, a bank’s relationships with an issuer’s main 
rivals is likely to have two additional effects besides the risk of information leakage, in the form of the 
bank having greater industry expertise and disclosing information about its other clients to the issuer. 
Clearly, finer tests are required to disentangle these effects in the data. Furthermore, the possibility that 
the rival client has in fact switched banks could easily account for this univariate result. 
E. Bank Reputation 
Bank reputation is a key determinant of the demand for underwriting services. We use two types of 
proxies for a bank’s reputation capital. The first type, following Megginson and Weiss (1991), uses a 
bank’s prior-year shares of the equity and debt underwriting markets. Table II shows that successful 
candidate banks have, on average, significantly larger equity and debt market shares than other banks. 
The second type measures a candidate bank’s standing in the industry in a way similar to Carter 
and Manaster’s (1990) analysis of banks’ tombstone rankings. Rather than tombstone advertisements, 
which are not readily available, we analyze syndication relationships at the lead manager and co-
manager levels using social network analysis. We expect better networked banks to have an advantage 
in the competition for lead management mandates. We view banks as better networked the more 
frequently they are chosen as syndication partners by other banks, and construct a measure called 
indegree which varies from zero (for a bank that has syndicated with no other banks) to one (for a bank 
that has syndicated with every bank).16 Table II shows that the average successful candidate bank has 
syndicated equity deals with 4.6% of all banks, which is significantly greater than the average indegree 
of 2.8% among unsuccessful candidates. The difference is even greater in the debt sample. 
While indegree captures whether a bank is popular, it does not allow for reputation differences 
                                                          
16 Bank j’s indegree =d tj ,  ∑ >−i d tjlSI )0( 1,, /(N–1), where I( ) is an indicator function evaluating whether bank j served as co-
manager in deals lead-managed by bank l in year t-1, and N is the number of distinct lead managers that year. 
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among its syndication partners. Assuming that status and influence derive, in part, from being 
networked to others who themselves are well-networked, we construct a second measure of network 
position called eigenvector centrality (Bonacich (1972, 1987)). This weights a bank’s ties to others by 
the importance of the banks it is tied to.17 As Table II illustrates, successful candidate banks have 
relationships with significantly better-networked banks than do the losing candidate banks. 
F. Bank Characteristics  
A recurring empirical challenge is how to disentangle the effects of information disclosure 
concerns and a bank’s industry expertise garnered from dealing with the issuer’s rivals. As a first pass, 
we measure a bank’s industry expertise as the combined concurrent product market share of its clients 
in the issuer’s four-digit SIC industry. Product market shares are computed from annual Compustat net 
sales data. Successful candidate banks have vastly greater industry expertise. The combined market 
share of their clients averages 12% ahead of equity deals and 22.3% ahead of debt deals, compared to 
the average combined market share of the unsuccessful banks’ clients of 1.6% and 3.3%, respectively.  
We also construct a “loyalty index” measuring how often a bank retains its clients in consecutive 
deals.18 The index varies between zero and 100%. It is intended to control for unobserved factors such 
as execution capability etc. that affect an issuer’s choice. Banks whose clients are typically generally 
loyal likely have more desirable characteristics. As Table II shows, companies are relatively loyal: The 
average successful candidate bank has a loyalty index of 61.4% ahead of equity transactions and 
49.1% ahead of debt transactions. By comparison, unsuccessful candidate banks retain their clients 
only 44% and 33.2% of the time on average ahead of equity and debt transactions, respectively.  
In some specifications, we control for whether a candidate bank was involved in a merger around 
the time of the sample transaction, given prior evidence that mergers can help expand a bank’s client 
                                                          
17 The weights are the reciprocal of the principal eigenvector dtp  of a symmetric matrix recording whether banks l and j 
syndicated one or more transactions of type d = {equity, debt} in year t-1. Formally, eigenvector ∑=≡ l dltdljtdjtd tj EpE, . 
18 Let Ick and Irk = 1 if bank j lead-managed company k’s penultimate and most recent equity deals, respectively, in the five 
years to quarter t, and 0 otherwise. Then bank j’s loyalty index = Σk Ick Irk / Σk Ick (the number of retained clients over the 
total number of clients).  
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base. In a separate test reported in Section III.C, we will design an experiment around bank mergers in 
an attempt to identify the effect of information disclosure concerns on company behavior.  
Our final control compares the size of the deal at hand to the bank’s average deal size in the prior 
calendar year. This is intended to capture the fact that a bank is unlikely to lead manage a deal that is 
either unusually large or unusually small given its normal deal size. The comparison of means reported 
in Table II shows relatively little difference between winning and losing banks on this dimension. 
III. Information Disclosure and Demand for Underwriting Services 
A. Lead Manager Choice Models 
Our first model takes as the unit of observation an issuing firm seeking external finance at a given 
date. The firm, having decided on the form of financing (i.e., debt or equity), chooses a bank to act as 
lead manager. Recall that we treat the 50 largest banks as competing to become lead manager. To 
investigate the determinants of the issuer’s choice of lead manager we estimate a standard multivariate 
probit specification. Each company k is modeled as having a utility kjtkjtjtkjt xRu εβα ++=    associated 
with each of the 50 competing banks j, where Rjt = 1 if bank j has a rival client in the issuer’s four-digit 
SIC industry, the xkj are other determinants of lead manager choice, and the εkj is an observation-
specific idiosyncratic shock that is assumed to have a normal distribution. Faced with these utilities 
over choices, each firm chooses the candidate bank that maximizes its utility.  
To identify the effect of a candidate bank’s relationship with a rival on a firm’s decision to choose 
the bank as lead manager, we need to control for other factors bearing on the choice. Perhaps most 
importantly, we control for bank reputation and for prior bank-firm relationships established through 
the candidate bank having served as lead or co-manager on the issuer’s prior deals, which Ljungqvist, 
Marston, and Wilhelm (2005, 2006) have shown to affect lead manager choice positively. In addition, 
we include our proxy for the bank’s industry expertise alongside the bank loyalty variable, a dummy 
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variable identifying recent mergers involving the bank, and the log absolute difference between the 
size of the firm’s deal at hand and the candidate bank’s average deal size in the previous year.19,20 Note 
that we need only include firm characteristics to the extent that they interact with bank characteristics. 
All other firm characteristics are common to all choices and thus cancel out in the probit specification. 
We refrain from pooling equity and debt deals to allow firms to have specialized relationship 
banks. For the 5,272 equity deals completed between 1975 and 2003, col. (1) of Table III shows that a 
candidate bank’s chances of becoming lead manager improve significantly, the stronger its prior 
underwriting relationship with the issuer; the greater its reputational standing; the greater its industry 
expertise; the more loyal its clients; following a merger; and if the deal is similar in size to the bank’s 
typical deal. The pseudo R2 of 21.6% suggests the specification has good fit. 
Controlling for these effects, we find that firms are loath to share a lead manager with one of the 
three largest firms in their industry. This effect, which is strongly statistically significant, is consistent 
with the information disclosure conjecture. Its economic significance is about as large as that of prior 
bank-issuer relationships and of bank reputation. Specifically, having a relationship with an issuer’s 
top 3 rival reduces a bank’s likelihood of becoming lead manager by 16% (i.e., by 35 basis points from 
the 2.2% unconditional likelihood), holding all other covariates at their sample means.21  
The negative sign of this rival-client effect contrasts with the univariate results shown in Table II. 
The control responsible for switching the sign on the top 3-rival variable in the multivariate model is 
our measure of industry expertise. Given that the industry expertise variable contains no information 
about the identity of the bank’s clients, we can rule out mechanical reasons for the sign switch. Instead, 
it appears that the trade-off between the risk of information disclosure and the benefits of industry 
                                                          
19 Because we cannot observe the fees quoted by banks that subsequently fail to win an underwriting mandate, we do not 
attempt to control for price competition. However, as pointed out in the introduction, cross-sectional variation in percentage 
fees paid is minimal, at least for equity deals. 
20 Unlike Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2005, 2006), we do not control for research coverage provided by a candidate 
bank as coverage data is not available for the first half of our sample period. Including research coverage in the second half 
of our sample period strengthens our conclusions concerning the effect of relationships with rivals on lead manager choice. 
21 The unconditional likelihood is greater than 2% (one in 50) because some issuers hire more than one lead manager. 
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expertise is a first-order identification problem, as conjectured. 
In contrast to the negative effect of relationships with a top 3 rival, firms appear eager to share a 
lead manager with one of the smaller firms in their industry (those ranked fourth through tenth by 
sales). This suggests that industry expertise is still tainting the estimates of the negative impact of 
information disclosure, despite our attempts at controlling for industry expertise directly. Since the 
benefits of industry expertise introduce a positive bias to the estimates of relationships with an issuer’s 
rivals, the likely impact of information disclosure concerns are actually stronger than indicated by the 
estimated coefficients in Table III. We will attempt to remove this bias in subsequent sections. 
In columns (2) and (3) of Table III we split the sample period in 1990 – roughly the time when 
commercial banks began entering the market. While the control variables behave similarly in the two 
sub-periods, the negative effect of a candidate bank having relationships with one of the issuer’s three 
largest rivals is larger and more significant in the 1975-1989 sample. This finding tallies with the 
evidence shown in Figures 3a and 4a that relationships have become both less exclusive (in the sense 
of banks increasingly having more than one large client in an industry) and much less concentrated (in 
the sense of firms increasingly using more than one bank for their investment banking needs).  
The results for the debt sample, reported in Table IV, are very similar. Notably, relationships with 
the largest rivals significantly reduce the likelihood that the bank wins the lead management mandate 
(col. (1)), and unlike in the equity sample, this effect is present and significant in both sub-periods 
(columns (2) and (3)). Economically, the effect is similar in magnitude, at 36 basis points or a 15.7% 
decrease in the selection likelihood, to that in the equity sample. 
It is conceivable that firms have no problem sharing underwriters with their rivals but banks face 
capacity constraints that prevent them from working for more than one large issuer at a time. To 
investigate this alternative explanation further, we distinguish between situations where the bank has a 
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rival relationship and the rival is in the process of issuing securities with the bank’s help and situations 
where the bank has a rival relationship but the rival is not raising capital in the same quarter as the 
issuer. We find no difference between these situations (results available on request), so capacity 
constraints do not appear to account for our findings. 
B. Issuer and Issue Characteristics 
Table V explores whether the aversion to sharing banks is stronger among particular types of 
issuers or in certain types of deals.22 First, we expect frequent issuers to be particularly sensitive to 
information disclosure concerns assuming they disclose more information to their lead managers than 
do infrequent issuers. We include in the probit specification an interaction term crossing the indicator 
variable identifying banks that have one or more clients among the three largest firms in the industry 
with the issuer’s log cumulative amount raised in equity (col. (1)) or debt (col. (2)) securities offerings 
in the prior five years. In both the equity and debt samples, we find that the effect of relationships with 
rivals becomes significantly more negative the greater the firm’s issue activity, as expected.23  
Second, information disclosure concerns might be greater in oligopolistic industries than in 
perfectly competitive markets. When we interact the rival relationship dummy with a Herfindahl index 
of industry concentration, we find support for this conjecture among both equity and debt issuers in 
Table V. Firms in relatively unconcentrated industries such as apparel manufacturing (1997 Herfindahl 
= 100.6) appear relatively unconcerned about sharing underwriters: For them, the existence of a rival 
relationship at the top 3 level reduces a bank’s chances of becoming lead manager by six basis points 
in equity deals and 16 basis points in debt deals, all else equal. In concentrated industries, the effect is 
much greater. For copper smelters, for instance (1997 Herfindahl = 2,392.3), the likelihood decreases 
                                                          
22 Arguably, information disclosure concerns should be stronger in opaque industries. However, while there are generally 
accepted proxies for opacity at the firm level (e.g., R&D intensity, the use of intangible assets, asset volatility), there are no 
corresponding proxies at the industry level. In our experience, the within-industry variation of the firm-level proxies dwarfs 
the across-industry variation, making it extremely hard to classify industries into opaque or transparent. 
23 Note that we do not include issue activity itself in the model, as this is common to all choices and thus cancels out in the 
probit specification. It is trivial to show that our specification is not subject to the usual criticism that interaction terms in 
non-linear models (such as probit) do not capture the difference in marginal effects (see, for instance, Powers (2005)). 
  
20
 
 
by 40 and 56 basis points in equity and debt deals, respectively.  
Third, we explore whether issuers of investment grade bonds are less averse to sharing 
underwriters than issuers of high-yield bonds, which are closer to equity and require more extensive 
due diligence. The insignificant interaction term shown in Table V suggests this is not the case. But its 
positive sign raises the possibility that junk bond issuers have higher demand for industry expertise, 
perhaps because this enables the bank to more credibly certify the issue. Interacting the dummy 
variable for high-yield bonds with both the top 3 rival indicator and our proxy for industry expertise 
supports this argument: Industry expertise has a greater beneficial effect on selection in high-yield 
issues than in investment-grade ones, and controlling for this effect, high-yield issuers are roughly 
twice as prone to avoiding sharing an underwriter with their three largest competitors.  
C. Exploiting Variation due to Bank Merger Activity 
A potential concern is that the probit coefficients on rival relationships reported in Tables III-V 
imperfectly identify the impact of information disclosure concerns on lead manager choice because an 
underwriter’s industry expertise, skill in executing the transaction, or some other quality variable may 
be creating an endogeneity problem. Similar identification concerns arise if we consider the candidate 
banks themselves as having a say in whom they do business with (Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt 
(2005)). For instance, a bank may not compete for an issuer’s business if it feels this would generate 
concerns among its existing clients or concentrate sectoral exposure too much. 
To address these concerns, we look for exogenous events that shock the bank-firm matching such 
that the risk of damaging information disclosure is increased for some firms, holding everything else 
constant. Under the information disclosure conjecture, we expect that the firms concerned will react to 
such a shock by minimizing the risk of damaging information disclosure, while other firms will take no 
action.  
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The consolidation of investment banking over the sample period, and especially during the 1990s, 
in anticipation of the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, gives a useful instance of an exogenous shock 
with which to isolate the effect of concerns about information disclosure on the matching of banks and 
firms. The following diagram presents our identification strategy: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram shows two banks, B1 and B2, and their respective client firms, F1 and F2, assumed to 
be product-market competitors. At some point B1 and B2 merge. According to the information 
disclosure conjecture, the merger should lead to one of the two client firms switching banks (although 
we have no prediction as to which). The empirical analogue of Diagram 1 is that the probability of a 
firm ending its bank relationship should increase after a merger involving a bank that has a relationship 
with one of the firm’s main product-market rivals.  
This test provides an empirical measure of the propensity to change relationship banks given a 
change in the risk of information disclosure. It helps us distinguish information disclosure concerns 
from industry expertise effects, since the industry expertise of the population of banks other than the 
merging banks is unaffected by the merger and so is held constant. Likewise, it allows us to eliminate 
the effect of not controlling adequately for a bank’s skill in executing the transaction or some other 
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quality variable. If these are driving a firm’s lead manager choice, we should find no difference, 
following a given bank merger, in the switching behavior of firms in those industries where the banks 
have competing clients and those where they do not.  
Formally, this is a difference-in-difference test using bank merger activity as the source of 
exogenous variation. We compare the switching behavior of a treatment group (those firms whose 
relationship bank has, since their last securities issue, merged with their chief rival’s relationship bank) 
to the switching behavior of two control groups: Those whose relationship bank has merged with a 
bank lacking relationships with the largest firms in the industry (control group 1), and those whose 
relationship bank has not undergone a recent merger (control group 2). If firms have information 
disclosure concerns, we expect greater switching in the treatment group than in either of the two 
control groups, and we expect no difference in switching in control group 1 compared to control group 
2, all else equal.  
To implement the test, we estimate the probability that an issuer switches lead managers in 
consecutive equity or debt deals. A switch is defined as an equity (debt) issuer hiring as lead manager 
any bank other than the lead manager of its most recent equity (debt) deal (or, if that bank has since 
been acquired, its successor). In the case of multiple lead managers on a deal, we code as a switch any 
failure to retain every lead manager from the previous deal.24 Excluding first-time deals, which cannot 
involve a switch, yields 3,177 equity deals and 9,939 debt deals over the 1975-2003 sample period.  
Figures 5a and 5b graph the switching propensity and the quarterly number of transactions for the 
equity and debt samples, respectively. On average, large firms switch lead managers in 1,670 of the 
3,177 equity deals (52.6%) and 5,977 of the 9,939 debt deals (63.7%). For comparison, Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2005) report a 35.9% switching rate between a company’s IPO and its first seasoned equity 
offering, over the period 1993-2003. Thus, firms appear to switch lead managers more frequently as 
                                                          
24 This is the most logical way to code the data, but our results are not sensitive to this coding choice. 
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they mature. We are not aware of prior estimates of the switching rate for debt issuers, but it is clear 
that it is considerably higher than for equity issuers. 
We identify 202 mergers involving sample banks over the 1970-2003 period. We distinguish three 
cases: Mergers between investment banks; mergers between commercial banks active in securities 
underwriting; and acquisitions of investment banks by commercial banks. Figure 6 shows three distinct 
merger waves, with the last one, beginning in 1994 and ending in 2001, the most active.  
Our identification strategy requires a bank not just to merge, but to merge with a bank that has rival 
clients. As it turns out, this appears to be something banks have largely avoided doing. Among the 202 
mergers, only 12 involve banks with rival equity clients and only 19 with rival debt clients ranked 
among the ten largest firms in a given industry. Conditional on there being overlap, the average merger 
involves 3.9 industries in which both banks have large equity clients (47 industries in total) and 6.3 
industries in which both banks have large debt clients (119 industries in total).25 Assuming 
conservatively that each bank involved in a merger has one client per industry gives a maximum 
number of treatment cases of 94 for equity and 238 for debt (fewer to the extent that some clients of 
the acquirer’s or the target’s have not raised capital in the remaining sample years since the merger). 
Generally, even when a merger involved overlap, the extent of overlap is small. On average, only 
6.7% (12%) of the combined number of industries in which the merging banks had large equity (debt) 
clients overlap. This pattern could signify a general reluctance to merge with a bank whose client 
relationships would upset the existing bank-firm matching. Alternatively, we cannot rule out that the 
large number of industries and banks in the sample leads to a small probability of two random banks 
having overlapping industry exposure. Either way, the small number of treatment cases will make it 
harder to find the predicted effect in the data, especially once we look for firms in the relevant 
industries completing securities transactions before and after a bank merger.  
                                                          
25 The merger with the greatest degree of overlap was the November 2000 acquisition of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette by 
CS First Boston, which overlapped in 23 industries for debt and 11 industries for equity. 
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Of the 3,177 equity deals, 630 follow a merger involving the bank lead-managing the issuer’s 
previous deal. In 49 of these, the previous lead manager merged with a bank that had a relationship 
with one of the issuer’s top 10 rivals; focusing on rivals in the top 3, there are 18 cases. These events 
are clearly associated with increased switching: 17 of the 18 issuers (94.4%) and 38 of the 49 issuers 
(77.6%) switch in response to their relationship bank merging with the relationship bank of one of their 
top 3 or top 10 rivals, respectively. For comparison, mergers with banks lacking relationships in the 
industry (control group 1) are followed by a 63.3% switching rate while issuers whose relationship 
bank has not undergone a recent merger (control group 2) switch 49.6% of the time. Statistically, the 
switching rates of the two control groups are significantly lower than those of the treatment groups.  
The corresponding results for the debt sample are statistically and economically weaker. 848 deals 
follow a merger since the issuer’s previous deal, with a switching rate of 67%. In the 63 (23) cases 
involving a target bank with relationships among the ten (three) largest firms in the issuer’s industry, 
switching occurs 74.6% (73.9%) of the time. The switching rate in the absence of a merger is 63.3%.  
These results, at least in the equity sample, provide preliminary support for the information 
disclosure conjecture. However, they make no attempt to control for other determinants of the 
switching decision. We therefore turn to multivariate probit specifications that include the control 
variables considered in Tables III and IV. In addition, we control for the log time since the firm’s 
previous deal in view of prior evidence that the switching probability increases with time (Ljungqvist 
and Wilhelm (2005)). Figures 7a and 7b present kernel density estimates for the time between 
consecutive equity and debt deals, respectively. Most repeat equity issuers complete deals every one or 
two years; debt issuers typically do deals more frequently.26  
The probit models in columns (1) and (3) of Table VI use all 3,177 equity and 9,393 debt deals, 
                                                          
26 This might raise concerns that some consecutive debt deals may not, in fact, be independent of each other, leading to 
biased inferences if issuers pre-select their lead managers for a sequence of debt deals spaced a few weeks or months apart. 
To address this concerns, we have repeated every test excluding the 1% most active debt issuers (101 unique firms), which 
account for around a third of debt deals overall and two-thirds of the deals that complete within a short time (say 7, 30, or 
60 days) of the most recent deal. All results are unaffected.  
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respectively. The base category is control group 2, so we test whether a) firms in the treatment group 
and b) firms in control group 1 are more likely to switch than are firms in control group 2. Columns (2) 
and (4) drop control group 2, focusing on the 630 equity and 848 debt deals that follow a bank merger, 
respectively. Here, we test for differences between the treatment group and control group 1. 
Consider briefly the control variables. Issuers are less likely to switch the stronger their 
underwriting relationship with the bank. While a large equity market share does not insulate a bank 
from being dropped, a large debt market share does. Position in the network of banks has a similar 
effect. Banks whose clients are generally more loyal are less likely to be dropped in a given deal. 
Issuers switch when their deal is either unusually large or unusually small compared to the bank’s 
typical deal size. Their switching propensity increases with time since their last deal. 
Controlling for these factors, the positive and statistically significant coefficient estimated in col. 
(1) for firms in the treatment group (i.e., merger cases involving a bank whose clients include one of 
the issuer’s top 3 rivals) supports the information disclosure conjecture: Issuers intending to raise 
equity capital are indeed likely to switch to another bank in response to a shock to the bank-firm 
equilibrium that increases their risk of damaging information disclosure. Compared to the two control 
groups, the switching probability is significantly greater in the treatment group, as predicted.27 
Economically, the effect is extremely large. The average switching rate is 33.2 percentage points 
greater in the treatment group than in control group 2, holding all other covariates in col. (1) at their 
sample means. (This difference is in line with that reported earlier for the bivariate comparison, 
indicating that the control variables included in Table VI have little effect on this result.) At the same 
time, we find no significant difference in switching between control groups 1 and 2, as predicted.  
Interestingly, mergers involving a bank whose clients include the issuer’s smaller (top 4-10) rivals 
                                                          
27 The coefficient provides an estimate of the difference in switching propensity between the treatment group and the base 
category, control group 2. Comparing this coefficient to the one estimated for firms issuing equity following mergers by 
their previous lead managers that involve merger partners without rival relationships, we see that the switching propensity 
is also significantly different between the treatment group and control group 1 (p = 0.048). 
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are also associated with a greater likelihood of switching. Although the coefficient is imprecisely 
estimated, it is large economically (e.g., it is 42% larger than the effect of increasing the prior bank-
issuer equity underwriting relationship by one standard deviation). The direction of this effect contrasts 
with our result in Table III that a bank having relationships with an issuer’s top 4-10 rivals is more 
likely to be chosen as lead manager. Earlier, we conjectured that the coefficient for top 4-10 rivals may 
pick up both information disclosure concerns and the beneficial effects of industry expertise. The fact 
that we now find no less switching statistically, and more switching economically, when the bank 
maintains relationships with an issuer’s smaller rivals validates our identification strategy.  
The model shown in col. (2) focuses on firms whose previous equity lead manager has undergone a 
merger since the issuer’s last deal by excluding control group 2. The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient estimated for firms in the treatment group confirms that it is a merger with a 
bank that has rival relationships, rather than a merger per se, that induces greater switching. This rules 
out the possibility that firms switch underwriters simply to avoid any upheaval accompanying mergers.  
The fact that we find no corresponding results for the debt sample in columns (3) and (4) could be 
due to the small number of relevant merger cases, or it could indicate that information disclosure 
concerns play a substantially smaller role in the debt markets.  
D. Exploiting Variation due to Firm Switching 
The exogenous variation provided by bank mergers enables us to identify information disclosure 
effects free from contamination due to industry expertise or unobserved bank quality, at least in the 
equity sample. The data suggest that firms have considerable concerns about confidential information 
being leaked to competitors. However, recall that this may be partially offset by the chance of gleaning 
useful information about their rivals in return. That is, there are both negative and positive aspects to 
information leakage (an information benefit and an information cost, respectively). 
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To separately identify these aspects, we exploit instances of firms switching away from their 
relationship bank. Identification builds on the following insight. For other issuers in the industry, a 
rival’s switch away from its former relationship bank presents a unique opportunity. This bank has 
both general industry expertise and specific knowledge of the rival, both of which are beneficial to an 
issuer, but there is no longer a risk of information leaking to the issuer’s rivals. In contrast, banks that 
continue to serve the issuer’s rivals have general industry expertise and offer both an information 
benefit (in the form of specific knowledge of the rival) and an information cost (in the form of possible 
information leakage). By comparing the propensity of firms to match with these two types of 
underwriters, we can isolate the cost of having information leak to a rival via a shared underwriter. 
Using this source of variation raises concerns about the exogeneity of the client switch. The main 
concern is that firms switch underwriters when quality of service has deteriorated. Thus, we run the 
risk of our treated banks being poor quality relative to the untreated set. The direction of this potential 
bias is such that it can only weaken any support we find for the information disclosure conjecture. 
We focus on two types of switches. The first can reasonably be thought of as exogenous. We 
consider a candidate bank’s rival client to have switched if it has been acquired by another firm at 
some point in the five years preceding the deal for which an issuing company is selecting a lead 
manager. We use CRSP delisting codes 200 and 300 to identify acquisitions. Our maintained 
assumption is that the merged firm’s CFO will most likely use the bank with which he has an existing 
relationship, leaving the target’s relationship bank in the position of having lost an important client.  
The second type of switch exploits variation in the duration of rival relationships. We consider a 
candidate bank’s rival client to have switched if the firm has awarded no underwriting business to the 
bank for T years, and report results for T=3 and T=5. Within T years of its most recent deal, a rival 
firm is coded as an active client of the bank’s. After T years, it is coded as a former or inactive client. 
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We assume the bank’s information about the rival client to decay following a switch, and so code the 
bank as having an inactive rival client for only one year following the switch (i.e., in year T+1). 
Beyond that, the bank is coded as no longer having a rival client in the industry. 
We implement the client switching identification strategy by adapting the probit models shown in 
Tables III and IV. Specifically, we adjust the reduced-form utility of a company k choosing bank j, 
kjtkjtjtkjt xRu εβα ++=    (where Rjt = 1 if the bank has a rival client in k’s industry) so that 
kjtkjt
s
jt
ns
jtkjt xRRu εβγα +++=   ˆˆ  
where nsjtR  = 1 if bank j has a large rival client in the issuer’s industry and that client has not switched 
(i.e., it remains an active rival client), sjtR  = 1 if the bank had a large rival client that has recently 
switched (i.e., an inactive rival client), xkjtβ is the impact of the other covariates in the model, and εkjt is 
the idiosyncratic i.i.d. taste parameter (distributed normally in the probit specification). 
To see where identification is coming from, we decompose αˆ  and γˆ . Let 
αˆ  = industry expertise + information cost + information benefit 
γˆ  = industry expertise + information benefit 
so that   γα ˆˆ −  = information cost  
The function γα ˆˆ −  can easily be constructed from estimated parameters. Standard errors are computed 
using the delta method (see Greene (2003, p. 916), theorem D.22). 
This identification strategy makes three assumptions: 1) An underwriter’s industry expertise is not 
affected by the switch, at least within the timeframe after the switch we consider; 2) the information 
benefit is similarly unaffected; and 3) the switch is orthogonal to any unobserved bank quality (though 
recall that failure of this assumption biases us against identifying the size of the information cost). 
Panel A of Table VII reports the three specifications, using firm mergers and client switches with 
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T=3 and T=5, respectively, to identify active and inactive rival clients, separately for equity and debt 
transactions. To conserve space, we report only the coefficients estimated for the active and inactive 
rival relationship dummies and the difference between the two. As per the above decomposition, this 
difference measures the net effect of concerns about information disclosure.  
The results provide strong support for the conjecture that information disclosure concerns have a 
first-order effect on firms’ choice of lead manager. The function γα ˆˆ −  is consistently negative and 
significant in five of the six specifications for the case of top 3 rivals and four of the six specifications 
for the case of top 4-10 rivals. The economic magnitude of the information cost, shown in the columns 
labelled dF/dx, is very large. An equity issuer, for instance, is 1.3 to 4.8 percentage points less likely to 
choose a bank that presents a risk of information leakage than one that does not, which is enormous 
relative to the unconditional likelihood of 2.2%. Comparing these estimated economic magnitudes to 
the much smaller ones of around 35 basis points in Tables III and IV, and recalling that relationships 
with top 4-10 rivals previously appeared to help a bank become lead manager, supports our view that 
our earlier estimates were contaminated by the beneficial effects of industry expertise. Compared to 
the bank merger identification strategy in the previous section, we here appear to have sufficient power 
to establish that debt issuers too are concerned about information leakage. 
When we split the sample period in 1990, we find evidence of a weakening over time in the 
negative effect of information disclosure concerns, especially when the bank has rival relationships 
with one of the three largest firms in the issuer’s industry; see Panels B and C of Table VII.  
Finally, note that γˆ  is not only almost invariably positive and significant but also frequently large 
economically. Depending on the specification, a bank is several percentage points more likely to be 
chosen if it used to have relationships with one of the issuer’s main rivals. This suggests that industry 
expertise and intimate knowledge of key rivals do, in fact, play a key role in underwriter selection.   
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IV. Conclusions 
Collectively, our tests suggest that an issuing firm’s concerns about information leakage are at least 
as important as its existing underwriting relationships and bank reputation in determining the identity 
of the lead manager in a given debt or equity deal. A less conservative view, based on our final test, 
suggests that this is a lower bound and that concerns about information leakage may be many times 
more important than any other previously documented effect.  
We argue that these results help explain why firms typically maintain long-lasting relationships 
with one investment bank. With a limited number of banks capable of executing large or complex 
deals, there simply may not be enough banks to allow each company to have multiple relationship 
banks while at the same time avoiding sharing banks with its major rivals. Moreover, firms may be 
hesitant to terminate a relationship out of concern the bank may then leak information to future clients.  
Our results have important implications for how competition among investment banks is viewed. 
They suggest that the position of incumbent banks is not as strong as was previously thought: 
Relationships are not everything and given a choice, issuers appear keen to maintain relationships with 
multiple banks so long as there is little risk sensitive information is disclosed to a rival. This is good 
news for entrants that have the capacity to handle complex deals, and the stunning shift away from 
exclusive bank-firm relationships during the 1990s suggests that entry by commercial banks has played 
an important role in loosening the constraint on firms’ choice set imposed by information leakage 
concerns since deregulation began in 1988. Similarly, banks that merge are unlikely to retain clients in 
industries where the merger results in rivals sharing an underwriter. We find that the probability of 
losing at least one such client is over 80% following such mergers. 
On the other hand, our evidence suggests that firms’ underwriter choice is more constrained than 
was previously thought. Concerns about information leakage appear to reduce the effective choice set 
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of lead managers enjoyed by an issuing firm. This would dampen the pressure of competition among 
banks, in the absence of a competitive shock such as a merger or entry. We conjecture that this may be 
a part of the reason so little price competition is observed in the underwriting market. 
Our study has examined demand for underwriting services and drawn implications for the nature of 
competition from the estimated structure of demand. To better understand the competitive nature of 
investment banking, and hence the way capital markets are accessed, it is also necessary to consider 
the supply side of the industry. In particular, a rigorous empirical understanding of the production 
function underlying investment banking would go a long way to fleshing out the appropriate 
competitive model of investment banking. This is no small task since the capital and labor used in 
production in this industry are meshed together in the minds of banks’ employees. Unraveling the 
returns to bankers at different stages of their careers would be a good place to start. Needless to say, 
this requires investment in datasets of a quite different nature than those used in this study. 
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Figure 1a. Equity Underwriting Market Shares of Top 50 Banks 
The graphs show, from bottom to top, the combined equity underwriting market shares of the four, 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 
largest equity underwriters each year, the first three of which are labeled C4, C10, and C20. 
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Figure 1b. Debt Underwriting Market Shares of Top 50 Banks 
The graphs show, from bottom to top, the combined debt underwriting market shares of the four, 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 
largest debt underwriters each year, the first three of which are labeled C4, C10, and C20. 
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Figure 2a. Number and Combined Equity Market Share of Commercial Banks 
The graphs show the combined equity (in 2a) and debt (in 2b) market share of commercial banks (on the right-hand axis) and 
the number of commercial banks that have positive market share in each year (on the left-hand axis). Deregulation began in 
1988 and the Glass-Steagall Act was repealed in 1999. There is underwriting by commercial banks prior to 1988 as some 
banks had grandfathered underwriting rights; due to the inclusion of foreign banks active in the U.S. capital markets; and 
because we include private placements, which fell outside the Glass-Steagall restrictions. 
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Figure 2b. Number and Combined Debt Market Share of Commercial Banks 
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Figure 3a. Exclusivity of Bank-firm Equity Relationships 
The graphs show the fraction of time that a given bank with at least one equity or debt relationship client among the three, 
five, or ten largest firms (by Compustat net sales) in a given four-digit SIC code in a given quarter has exactly one such 
relationship client.  
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Figure 3b. Exclusivity of Bank-firm Debt Relationships 
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Figure 4a. Concentration of Bank-firm Equity Relationships 
The graphs show the Herfindahl concentration index of bank-firm relationships, measured over the prior one, two, or three 
years, of the average U.S. issuer (weighted by each issuer’s cumulative proceeds over the relevant window). 
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Figure 4b. Concentration of Bank-firm Debt Relationships 
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Figure 5a. Switching Propensity in Consecutive Equity Transactions 
The bars represent the quarterly number of equity or debt transactions by issuers ranked among the ten largest firms in their 
industry by sales, excluding an issuer’s first recorded deal in 1970-2003 (as we focus on lead manager switches compared to 
the most recent deal). A switch is defined as the issuer hiring as lead manager any bank other than the lead manager of its 
most recent deal (or, if that bank has since been acquired, its successor). In the case of multiple lead managers on a deal, we 
code as a switch any failure to retain every lead manager from the previous deal. The quarterly fraction of switchers is 
indicated by “o” and measured on the right-hand axis. Note that we do not condition on the time between deals. 
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Figure 5b. Switching Propensity in Consecutive Debt Transactions 
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Figure 6. Annual Number of Bank Mergers 
The figure shows the annual number of bank mergers. We distinguish three cases: Mergers between two investment banks 
(IB-IB); mergers between two commercial banks (CB-CB); and acquisitions of investment banks by commercial banks (CB-
IB). We continue to call a commercial bank a commercial bank after it has acquired an investment bank. We include all 
mergers (and in two cases, joint ventures of the two banks’ capital markets divisions) by any bank involved in securities 
underwriting, according to Securities Data Corporation, between 1970 and 2003. As a consequence, the figure includes 
mergers between foreign banks, such as the 1984 merger between two Canadian commercial banks, Harris Bankcorp and 
Bank of Montreal. The total number of mergers included in the figure is 202.  
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Figure 7a. Kernel Density Estimate for Time between Consecutive Equity Deals 
The graph plots a kernel density estimate using an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth = 0.2 and N = 3,000, of the time in 
years between any two equity deals that a U.S. issuing firm ranked among the ten largest in its four-digit industry completes 
between 1970 and 2003. For the purpose of the graph (but not the kernel estimation), times longer than 20 years are not 
shown. 
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Figure 7b. Kernel Density Estimate for Time between Consecutive Debt Deals 
The graph plots a kernel density estimate using an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth = 0.2 and N = 3,000, of the time in 
years between any two debt deals that a U.S. issuing firm ranked among the ten largest in its four-digit industry completes 
between 1970 and 2003. For the purpose of the graph (but not the kernel estimation), times longer than 20 years are not 
shown. 
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Table I. The Sample of Capital-raising Transactions 
Thompson Financial’s Securities Data Corporation reports 54,659 capital-raising transactions completed between January 1970 and December 2003, after excluding non-
underwritten issues; transactions by firms classified as SIC 6000-6999 (financial institutions, etc.) and SIC 9000-9999 (government agencies, etc.); and offerings by non-
U.S. corporations. The sample used in the econometric analyses imposes three additional filters. First, because we require five years of data to establish prior relationships 
with rivals, the econometric models use data from 1975 onwards. Second, we require that each deal was lead-managed by one of the 50 largest underwriters active that year. 
Third, we focus on the ten largest firms (by Compustat net sales) in each four-digit SIC industry and ignore transactions involving smaller firms. In some specifications, we 
split the sample in 1990. All currency amounts are in 1996 constant dollars, deflated using the quarterly GNP deflator.  
 
      Estimation sample (ten largest firms per industry) 
 1970 - 2003  1975 - 2003  1975 - 1989  1990 - 2003 
  
No. of 
deals 
% of 
deals 
Aggregate 
amount 
raised 
($m, real) 
% of 
amt.   
No. of 
deals 
Aggregate 
amount 
raised 
($m, real) 
 
No. of 
deals 
Aggregate 
amount 
raised 
($m, real) 
 
No. of 
deals 
Aggregate 
amount 
raised 
($m, real) 
              
Equity              
 Common stock 19,388 35.5 1,244,409 24.4  5,012 570,972  2,240 126,844  2,772 444,128 
 Private common 2,579 4.7 63,488 1.2  260 11,199  87 4,220  173 6,979 
Debt                  
 Non-convertible debt 14,706 26.9 2,566,572 50.4  7,307 1,386,102  1,927 400,829  5,380 985,273 
 Convertible debt 1,458 2.7 177,474 3.5  609 97,286  396 39,772  213 57,514 
 Private non-convertible debt 12,248 22.4 764,347 15.0  3,741 261,637  1,877 148,959  1,864 112,678 
 Private convertible debt 481 0.9 11,162 0.2  77 3,397  46 1,432  31 1,965 
  
 Non-convertible preferred 1,288 2.4 123,761 2.4 
 
311 36,983 
 
165 18,389 
 
146 18,594 
 Convertible preferred 561 1.0 79,596 1.6  229 46,916  119 13,848  110 33,069 
 Private non-convertible preferred 747 1.4 22,337 0.4  78 3,776  52 2,305  26 1,471 
 Private convertible preferred 1,203 2.2 40,739 0.8  101 9,777  45 5,400  56 4,376 
              
All deals 54,659 100.0 5,093,886 100.0  17,725 2,428,044  6,954 761,998  10,771 1,666,045 
                       
 
Table II. Descriptive Statistics 
The unit of observation is a bank-deal pair. The estimation dataset consists of 5,272 equity deals and 12,453 debt deals 
completed by firms ranked among the ten largest in their four-digit SIC industries (based on Compustat net sales) between 
1975 and 2003, for each of which the 50 largest banks are deemed to compete to become lead manager (except where fewer 
than 50 banks were active in the market at the time). This gives a sample of 262,580 bank-deal pairs for equity and 610,500 
for debt. The columns headed ‘winning banks’ refer to the bank-deal pairs involving banks that were awarded lead-
management assignments, while the columns headed ‘losing banks’ refer to the bank-deal pairs involving banks that were 
eligible to compete for but were not chosen as lead manager. Note that some deals have more than one lead manager, and so 
the number of winning banks exceeds the number of deals. For each bank-deal pair, we report the main explanatory variables 
used in the econometric models. A candidate bank’s prior relationships with the issuing company and with the issuing 
company’s product market rivals are based on their joint capital raising histories before the deal in question. The loyalty 
index measures how often a bank retains its underwriting clients in consecutive deals. To measure a candidate bank’s 
position in the network of syndicate banks, we compute indegree (the number of unique banks it has syndicated with in the 
prior calendar year, normalized by the number of possible syndication partners) and eigenvector centrality (a recursive 
measure of indegree that weights syndication ties by how well networked each syndication partner is). A bank’s industry 
expertise is proxied by the combined product market share of its clients in the same SIC4 industry as the issuer, at the time of 
the deal. The last column provides t-tests of differences in means/fractions comparing winning to losing banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continued over 
 
Table II. Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
 
 Winning banks  Losing banks   
 
Mean or 
fraction St.dev.  
Mean or 
fraction St.dev.  t-test 
Panel A: Equity Transactions N=5,694  N=256,886   
Bank-firm relationships (lead)        
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals as lead prior 4 quarters (%) 6.5 22.9  0.2 3.6  95.6 
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals as lead prior 4 quarters (%) 13.0 32.6  0.1 3.4  165.1 
Bank-firm relationships (co-manager)        
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals as co-manager prior 4 quarters (%) 0.8 6.9  0.1 2.3  22.0 
bank’s share of firm’s eq. deals as co-manager prior 4 quarters (%) 1.2 9.0  0.2 3.6  19.8 
Bank-rival relationships        
=1 if bank has ≥1 clients among 3 largest firms in industry (%) 5.5   1.6   22.4 
=1 if bank has ≥1 clients among the 4-10 largest firms in ind. (%) 8.8   2.7   27.5 
Bank characteristics        
bank’s equity market share in prior calendar year (%) 6.0 6.2  1.8 3.9  79.2 
bank’s debt market share in prior calendar year (%) 6.0 6.0  1.8 3.9  79.7 
bank’s indegree centrality 4.6 2.6  2.8 2.6  52.6 
bank’s eigenvector centrality  26.4 12.2  13.7 12.8  73.9 
bank’s industry expertise (%) 12.0 20.0  1.6 8.1  90.8 
bank’s loyalty (%) 61.4 21.8  44.0 35.1  37.2 
=1 if bank involved in merger (%) 8.4   5.3   10.5 
abs(deal size – bank’s mean deal size in prior calendar year) ($m) 95.5 339.2  95.8 271.4  -0.1 
        
Panel B: Debt Transactions N=13,861  N=596,639   
Bank-firm relationships (lead)        
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals as lead prior 4 quarters (%) 17.8 32.6  0.8 6.9  236.9 
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals as lead prior 4 quarters (%) 4.2 19.3  0.2 4.5  86.9 
Bank-firm relationships (co-manager)        
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals as co-manager prior 4 quarters (%) 3.0 11.6  0.4 3.7  77.1 
bank’s share of firm’s eq. deals as co-manager prior 4 quarters (%) 1.0 8.3  0.2 2.8  34.4 
Bank-rival relationships         
=1 if bank has ≥1 clients among 3 largest firms in industry (%) 23.6   6.1   82.4 
=1 if bank has ≥1 clients among the 4-10 largest firms in ind. (%) 21.9   5.7   79.1 
Bank characteristics        
bank’s equity market share in prior calendar year (%) 6.7 6.7  1.7 3.9  143.0 
bank’s debt market share in prior calendar year (%) 7.9 5.9  1.9 3.8  182.4 
bank’s indegree centrality 8.7 4.0  4.2 4.3  122.5 
bank’s eigenvector centrality  30.2 13.0  12.7 13.8  147.9 
bank’s industry expertise (%) 22.3 24.6  3.3 11.2  190.7 
bank’s loyalty (%) 49.1 15.8  33.2 30.9  60.2 
=1 if bank involved in merger (%) 9.6   6.8   13.1 
abs(deal size – bank’s mean deal size in prior calendar year) ($m) 128.3 253.2  121.6 210.7  3.7 
 
Table III. Lead Manager Choice – Equity  
We estimate the probability that a given bank is chosen to lead-manage a particular securities transaction. We focus on 
deals involving a firm ranked among the ten largest by Compustat net sales in its four-digit SIC industry that year, and treat 
the 50 largest equity underwriters by market share that year as being in competition for each deal. (Note there were only 35 
banks active in equity underwriting in 1975.) The dependent variable equals 1 if the bank won the lead-management 
mandate, and 0 otherwise. There are 15,475 equity deals during the sample period 1975-2003, of which 5,272 involve a top 
10 firm in column (1). In columns (2) and (3) we split the sample period in 1990. The models are estimated using probit. 
Intercepts are not shown. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (which are clustered on deal id) are shown in italics. 
We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level (two-sided), respectively.  
 
 Equity transactions 
 1975-2003  1975-1989  1990-2003
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Bank-rival relationships      
=1 if bank has one or more clients among the three largest firms in industry -0.139***  -0.284*** -0.097* 
 0.036  0.064 0.043 
=1 if bank has one or more clients among the 4-10 largest firms in industry 0.142***  0.059 0.153*** 
 0.027  0.047 0.033 
Bank-firm relationships (lead)     
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals as lead in prior four quarters 1.342***  1.567*** 1.125*** 
 0.069  0.096 0.101 
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals as lead in prior four quarters 2.206***  2.011*** 2.298*** 
 0.053  0.088 0.066 
Bank-firm relationships (co-manager)     
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals as co-manager in prior four quarters 0.604***  0.524* 0.781*** 
 0.152  0.218 0.205 
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals as co-manager in prior four quarters 0.646***  0.592*** 0.663*** 
 0.095  0.164 0.115 
Bank characteristics     
bank’s equity market share in prior calendar year 2.015***  0.878*** 3.409*** 
 0.166  0.248 0.338 
bank’s debt market share in prior calendar year 2.339***  1.998*** 1.437*** 
 0.168  0.240 0.298 
bank’s indegree centrality 4.399***  0.027 3.989*** 
 0.278  1.593 0.384 
bank’s eigenvector centrality  1.470***  1.323*** 1.984*** 
 0.062  0.083 0.107 
bank’s industry expertise 1.038***  1.313*** 0.835*** 
 0.049  0.088 0.058 
bank’s loyalty 0.276***  0.203*** 0.377*** 
 0.022  0.031 0.034 
=1 if bank involved in merger  0.099*  -0.046 0.171*** 
 0.039  0.073 0.048 
ln abs(deal size – bank’s mean deal size in prior calendar year) -0.121***  -0.169*** -0.109*** 
 0.005  0.008 0.006 
Diagnostics     
Pseudo R2 21.6 %  19.3 %  24.4 % 
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 9,878***  3,576***  6,320*** 
No. of equity transactions 5,272  2,327  2,945 
 
Table IV. Lead Manager Choice – Debt  
We estimate the probability that a given bank is chosen to lead-manage a particular securities transaction. We focus on 
deals involving a firm ranked among the ten largest by Compustat net sales in its four-digit SIC industry that year, and treat 
the 50 largest debt underwriters by market share that year as being in competition for each deal. (Note there were fewer 
than 50 banks active in debt underwriting in 1975-1980 and in 2002.) The dependent variable equals 1 if the bank won the 
lead-management mandate, and 0 otherwise. There are 29,674 debt deals during the sample period 1975-2003, of which 
12,453 involve a top 10 firm in column (1). In columns (2) and (3) we split the sample period in 1990. The models are 
estimated using probit. Intercepts are not shown. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (which are clustered on deal 
id) are shown in italics. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level (two-sided), respectively.  
 
 Debt transactions 
 1975-2003  1975-1989  1990-2003
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Bank-rival relationships      
=1 if bank has one or more clients among the three largest firms in industry -0.160***  -0.180*** -0.160*** 
 0.013  0.023 0.017 
=1 if bank has one or more clients among the 4-10 largest firms in industry 0.102***  0.084*** 0.097*** 
 0.012  0.021 0.014 
Bank-firm relationships (lead)     
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals as lead in prior four quarters 1.419***  1.450*** 1.371*** 
 0.024  0.038 0.031 
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals as lead in prior four quarters 0.697***  0.770*** 0.649*** 
 0.039  0.060 0.052 
Bank-firm relationships (co-manager)     
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals as co-manager in prior four quarters 0.994***  0.666*** 1.163*** 
 0.049  0.090 0.060 
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals as co-manager in prior four quarters 0.406***  0.502*** 0.373*** 
 0.083  0.125 0.111 
Bank characteristics     
bank’s equity market share in prior calendar year -0.264*  0.101 -1.069*** 
 0.107  0.132 0.183 
bank’s debt market share in prior calendar year 4.120***  3.303*** 4.899*** 
 0.125  0.173 0.209 
bank’s indegree centrality 3.237***  0.749** 4.186*** 
 0.138  0.266 0.157 
bank’s eigenvector centrality  1.343***  0.998*** 1.683*** 
 0.046  0.067 0.065 
bank’s industry expertise 1.117***  1.502*** 0.973*** 
 0.025  0.052 0.028 
bank’s loyalty 0.341***  0.332*** 0.386*** 
 0.015  0.025 0.019 
=1 if bank involved in merger  0.066**  -0.137* 0.104*** 
 0.024  0.065 0.027 
ln abs(deal size – bank’s mean deal size in prior calendar year) -0.062***  -0.099*** -0.049*** 
 0.003  0.005 0.004 
Diagnostics     
Pseudo R2 24.9 %  23.6 %  26.1 % 
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 34,148***  10,661***  23,309*** 
No. of debt transactions 12,453  4,627  7,826 
 
Table V. Lead Manager Choice – Issuer and Issue Characteristics 
As in Tables III and IV, we estimate the probability that a given bank is chosen to lead-manage a particular securities 
transaction. We include three separate interaction terms crossing the indicator variable identifying banks that have one or 
more clients among the three largest firms in the industry with: i) the issuer’s log cumulative amount raised in equity (col. 
(1)) or debt (col. (2)) securities offerings over the five years preceding the transaction in question; ii) a Herfindahl measure 
of industry concentration computed from annual Compustat net sales data; or iii) an indicator identifying high-yield bond 
issues (those rated as high-yield at issue by at least one of the three rating agencies with NRSRO designation). To conserve 
space, we report only the coefficients of interest. The models are estimated using probit. Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors (which are clustered on deal id) are shown in italics. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 
1%, and 5% level (two-sided), respectively.  
 
 Equity  Debt 
 (1)  (2) 
Frequent issuers   
=1 if bank has one or more clients among the three largest firms in industry -0.028 -0.062* 
 0.044 0.029 
   x ln cumulative amount raised in prior five years -0.055*** -0.015*** 
 0.014 0.004 
   
Industry concentration   
=1 if bank has one or more clients among the three largest firms in industry -0.017 -0.060*** 
 0.057 0.015 
   x annual Herfindahl index of industry concentration -0.500** -0.664*** 
 0.188 0.069 
   
High-yield vs. investment grade bonds   
=1 if bank has one or more clients among the three largest firms in industry  -0.163*** 
  0.014 
   x Dummy = 1 if the bond issue is rated high-yield  0.033 
  0.030 
   
High-yield vs. investment grade bonds   
=1 if bank has one or more clients among the three largest firms in industry  -0.145*** 
  0.014 
   x Dummy = 1 if the bond issue is rated high-yield  -0.166*** 
  0.047 
bank’s industry expertise  1.069*** 
  0.025 
   x Dummy = 1 if the bond issue is rated high-yield  0.493*** 
  0.075 
   
 
Table VI. Lead Manager Switches Following Bank Mergers 
We estimate the probability that an issuing company switches lead managers in consecutive equity or debt deals. A switch 
is defined as an equity (debt) issuer hiring as lead manager any bank other than the lead manager of its most recent equity 
(debt) deal (or, if that bank has since been acquired, its successor). In the case of multiple lead managers on a deal, we code 
as a switch any failure to retain every lead manager from the previous deal. We focus on deals involving a firm ranked 
among the ten largest by Compustat net sales in its four-digit SIC industry that year. All bank variables refer to 
characteristics of the lead manager in the previous deal measured as of the time of the current deal. The models are 
estimated using probit. Intercepts are not shown. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in italics. We use 
***, **, and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level (two-sided), respectively.  
 
 Equity  Debt 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Mergers and merger partner’s rival relationships      
=1 if bank involved in merger since previous deal but merger partner 0.036  0.026  
     has no rival relationships 0.068  0.054  
=1 if since previous deal, bank has merged with another bank that has  1.026* 0.983* 0.201 -0.006 
     one or more clients among 3 largest firms in issuer’s industry 0.500 0.494 0.278 0.290 
=1 if since previous deal, bank has merged with another bank that has  0.234 0.174 0.130 0.052 
     one or more clients among 4-10 largest firms in issuer’s industry 0.269 0.285 0.265 0.246 
Bank-firm relationships (lead)     
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals as lead in prior four quarters -0.373*** -1.077** -0.496*** 0.159 
 0.103 0.345 0.035 0.164 
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals as lead in prior four quarters -0.359*** -0.575* -0.175** 0.099 
 0.071 0.252 0.068 0.399 
Bank-firm relationships (co-manager)     
bank’s share of firm’s debt deals as co-manager in prior four quarters 0.993** -1.822 -0.082 0.590 
 0.385 0.980 0.154 1.670 
bank’s share of firm’s equity deals as co-manager in prior four quarters 0.608 -0.225 0.186 -0.143 
 0.560 1.523 0.157 1.202 
Bank characteristics     
bank’s equity market share in prior calendar year -0.190 -1.305 -0.051 0.088 
 0.640 1.658 0.253 1.174 
bank’s debt market share in prior calendar year -1.568* -1.583 -1.253*** -1.526 
 0.662 1.596 0.355 1.334 
bank’s indegree centrality 0.782 -2.468 -1.235* -0.650 
 1.274 2.668 0.505 1.933 
bank’s eigenvector centrality  -0.867*** -0.810 0.035 -1.059 
 0.251 0.619 0.188 0.766 
bank’s industry expertise 0.093 -0.419 0.043 0.113 
 0.119 0.254 0.055 0.186 
bank’s loyalty -1.026*** -0.850** -0.797*** -1.182*** 
 0.107 0.314 0.092 0.332 
ln abs(deal size – bank’s mean deal size in prior calendar year) 0.023 0.107* 0.026* 0.016 
 0.018 0.043 0.010 0.033 
Time since previous deal       
ln (1+ years since previous deal) 0.399*** 0.396*** -0.057* 0.431*** 
 0.048 0.093 0.026 0.080 
Diagnostics     
Pseudo R2 15.4 %  14.8 %  3.4 %  6.7 % 
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 591.9***  121.7***  393.9***  72.1*** 
No. of observations    3,177        630     9,393        848 
Table VII. Lead Manager Choice Following Rival Client Switches 
The models shown here are identical in every respect to the specifications shown in Tables III and IV, except that we split the effect of rival relationships into those that 
are active as of the time of the deal in question and those that are inactive. We consider three definitions of active and inactive. The first (labeled “mergers” in the table) 
considers a candidate bank’s rival client to be inactive if it has been acquired by another firm at some point in the five years preceding the deal in question (based on 
CRSP delisting codes 200 and 300). The second and third (labeled “switches” in the table) consider a candidate bank’s rival client to be inactive if the firm has awarded 
no underwriting business to the bank for five or three years, respectively. We assume the bank’s information about the rival client to decay following a switch, and so 
code the bank as having an inactive rival client for only one year following the switch (i.e., years 6 and 4, respectively). Beyond that, the bank is coded as no longer 
having a rival client (active or inactive). Choosing a bank that has an active rival client runs the risk of information disclosure to one of the issuer’s product-market 
competitors, though there are two potential offsetting benefits in the form of the bank having greater industry expertise or disclosing information about the rival client to 
the issuer. Choosing a bank that has an inactive rival client runs no corresponding risk but still offers both potential benefits. Therefore, the difference between the 
coefficients estimated for active and inactive rival clients isolates the effect of concerns about information disclosure to rival firms on lead manager choice. The models 
are estimated using probit, separately for equity and debt transactions, and for the entire sample period (Panel A) as well as split in 1990 (Panels B and C). To conserve 
space, we report only the coefficients estimated for active and inactive rival relationships, and the difference between the two (as a measure of the net effect of concerns 
about information disclosure). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (which are clustered on deal id) are shown in italics. The standard errors for the difference 
between each pair of coefficients are calculated using the delta method. We also report marginal effects (denoted dF/dx); for comparison, the unconditional likelihood of 
a bank becoming lead manager is about 2.2%. For the number of observations used in each specification, see Tables III and IV. We use ***, **, and * to denote 
significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 Equity Transactions  Debt Transactions 
 Mergers  Switches (T=5)  Switches (T=3)  Mergers  Switches (T=5)  Switches (T=3) 
 
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx  
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx  
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx  
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx  
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx  
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx 
Panel A: 1975-2003                  
= 1 if bank has active top 3 rival  -0.131*** -0.003  -0.115*** -0.003  -0.087* -0.002  -0.166*** -0.004  -0.164*** -0.004  -0.118*** -0.003 
 0.036   0.036   0.040   0.014   0.014   0.014  
= 1 if bank has inactive top 3 rival 0.255 0.010  0.295** 0.012  0.273*** 0.011  -0.148 -0.003  0.729*** 0.044  0.368*** 0.015 
 0.158   0.098   0.074   0.112   0.074   0.052  
Difference -0.386* -0.013  -0.409*** -0.015  -0.359*** -0.013  -0.019 0.000  -0.894*** -0.048  -0.487*** -0.018 
 0.162   0.104   0.082   0.112   0.076   0.053  
                  
= 1 if bank has active top 4-10 rival  0.176*** 0.006  0.174*** 0.006  0.166*** 0.006  0.111*** 0.003  0.119*** 0.004  0.113*** 0.003 
 0.027   0.027   0.030   0.012   0.012   0.012  
= 1 if bank has inactive top 4-10 rival 0.213* 0.008  0.369*** 0.016  0.396*** 0.018  0.316*** 0.012  0.221** 0.007  0.309*** 0.012 
 0.109   0.079   0.059   0.071   0.079   0.051  
Difference -0.036 -0.002  -0.195* -0.010  -0.230*** -0.012  -0.205** -0.009  -0.103 -0.004  -0.196*** -0.008 
 0.113   0.085   0.067   0.071   0.081   0.053  
 
 
Continued over 
Table VII. Lead Manager Choice Following Rival Client Switches (Continued) 
 
 Equity Transactions  Debt Transactions 
 Mergers  Switches (T=5)  Switches (T=3)  Mergers  Switches (T=5)  Switches (T=3) 
 
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx  
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx  
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx  
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx  
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx  
Coeff. 
s.e. dF/dx 
Panel B: 1975-1989                  
= 1 if bank has active top 3 rival  -0.234*** -0.006  -0.233*** -0.006  -0.188** -0.005  -0.171*** -0.004  -0.174*** -0.004  -0.089*** -0.002 
 0.064   0.064   0.070   0.023   0.023   0.023  
= 1 if bank has inactive top 3 rival -0.220 -0.005  0.250 0.010  0.389*** 0.019  -0.319 -0.006  0.844*** 0.060  0.555*** 0.029 
 0.469   0.175   0.115   0.192   0.131   0.095  
Difference -0.014 0.000  -0.483** -0.016  -0.578*** -0.023  0.147 0.002  -1.018*** -0.064  -0.644*** -0.031 
 0.473   0.186   0.129   0.192   0.132   0.095  
                  
= 1 if bank has active top 4-10 rival  0.079 0.003  0.096* 0.003  0.122* 0.004  0.074*** 0.002  0.089*** 0.003  0.057* 0.002 
 0.045   0.045   0.050   0.021   0.021   0.023  
= 1 if bank has inactive top 4-10 rival 0.515** 0.029  0.391** 0.019  0.372*** 0.018  0.274* 0.010  0.224 -0.008  0.579*** -0.031 
 0.178   0.134   0.089   0.120   0.153   0.082  
Difference -0.436* -0.026  -0.295* -0.016  -0.250* -0.013  -0.200 -0.008  -0.134 -0.005  -0.523*** -0.029 
 0.184   0.142   0.104   0.121   0.154   0.085  
Panel C: 1990-2003                  
= 1 if bank has active top 3 rival  -0.105* -0.002  -0.085* -0.002  -0.058 -0.001  -0.177*** -0.004  -0.173*** -0.004  -0.143*** -0.003 
 0.044   0.043   0.048   0.017   0.017   0.017  
= 1 if bank has inactive top 3 rival 0.289 0.010  0.271* 0.009  0.152 0.005  -0.129 -0.003  0.640*** 0.033  0.255*** 0.008 
 0.167   0.118   0.098   0.139   0.090   0.064  
Difference -0.393* -0.013  -0.356** -0.011  -0.210* -0.006  -0.048 -0.001  -0.813*** -0.037  -0.398*** -0.011 
 0.173   0.125   0.107   0.139   0.092   0.066  
                  
= 1 if bank has active top 4-10 rival  0.207*** 0.007  0.193*** 0.006  0.168*** 0.005  0.118*** 0.003  0.122*** 0.003  0.124*** 0.003 
 0.034   0.033   0.037   0.014   0.014   0.015  
= 1 if bank has inactive top 4-10 rival 0.008 0.000  0.323*** 0.012  0.390*** 0.016  0.330*** 0.012  0.222* 0.007  0.177** 0.005 
 0.140   0.099   0.078   0.087   0.093   0.066  
Difference 0.198 0.006  -0.130 -0.006  -0.223* -0.010  -0.212* -0.009  -0.101 -0.004  -0.053 -0.002 
 0.146   0.107   0.088   0.087   0.095   0.068  
 
